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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CLYDE WADE, * 
Plaintiff/Respondent, * 
v, * 
LINDA JOBE, * Case No. 890443 
Defendant/Appellant. * Priority 14 b 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Second District Court 
in an action between a landlord and a tenant. Jurisdiction is 
proper pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(j) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issues presented on appeal are as follows: 
a) Whether, as a matter of law, residential rental agreements 
are "consumer transactions" as defined by the Utah Consumer Sales 
Practices Act. 
b) Whether the landlord violated the Consumer Sales 
Practices Act. 
c) Whether the rental of condemnable premises posing 
substantial health and safety hazards to the occupants is a 
deceptive or unconscionable act under the Consumer Sales Practices 
Act, and a violation thereof. 
d) Whether the renter is entitled to damages due to latent 
defects that rendered the premises inhabitable. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about June 25, 1988, tenant (Jobe entered into a rental 
agreement with landlord (Wade) for a single family dwelling at 2680 
Adams Ave., Ogden, Utah (R. 103, Finding No. 1). Approximately two 
weeks later, tenant arranged for water and electricity to be 
connected at the premises and took possession (R. 104, Finding No. 
3). Jobe has three young children (R. 30). 
Shortly thereafter, Jobe discovered that the kitchen and 
bathroom faucets leaked, that the bathroom sink leaked, the toilet 
frequently was clogged, and numerous light fixtures were inoperable 
(Tr. 29, 30). Within a few days, the water heater malfunctioned. 
When Jobe investigated, she learned that the flame of the water 
heater had been extinguished by accumulated sewage and water in the 
basement, which also produced a foul odor throughout the house (Tr. 
34, 40, 42, 44). 
Jobe notified landlord who came to the premises on numerous 
occasions to pump out the sewage and water from the basement onto 
the sidewalk (Tr. 34, 53). Each time after pumping, landlord relit 
the water heater and it functioned for a short period of time until 
the accumulated sewage and water extinguished the water heater 
pilot light again. These and various other problems persisted 
2 
throughout July, August, September and October. (Tr. 34, 42, 44, 
46, 56, 60, 61, 62, 63) 
In November, Jobe notified landlord that she would withhold 
further rent until the sewage problem was permanently repaired (Tr* 
24, 25). Landlord did not repair the sewage problem but contacted 
Ogden City asking that the building be closed and Jobe be ordered 
to vacate immediately (Tr. 57, 58, 59). A building inspector 
inspected the premises, declared it unsafe for human habitation on 
December 13, 1988, based primarily on a disconnected sewer line and 
raw sewage present in the basement, and ordered Jobe to vacate (Tr. 
37-39, Defendant's Exhibits 6D & 7D).1 Jobe vacated immediately 
(R. 104, Finding No. 4). 
Landlord brought suit against Jobe for unpaid rent and a writ 
of restitution in the Second Circuit Court of Weber County, Ogden 
Department (R. 1). Jobe filed a counterclaim seeking an offset 
against any rent owed due to the uninhabitable condition of the 
premises and seeking damages, attorney's fees, and declaratory 
relief under the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act (CSPA), Utah 
Code § 13-11-1 et seq. (R. 11-16). Jobe also filed a motion for 
removal of the matter to the district court pursuant to Utah Code 
§ 13-11-6, which motion was granted. A default judgment against 
1
 A subsequent report (Defendant's Exhibit 6D) disclosed 
numerous violations of both the Uniform Housing Code (UHC) and the 
Uniform Code for the Abatement of Dangerous Buildings (UCADB). 
3 
landlord on Jobe's counterclaim was entered by the district court 
on June 1, 1989, in the amount of $2r672. The default judgment was 
subsequently set aside pursuant to a stipulation of the parties. 
Trial was held on September 7, 1989, the Honorable Ronald 0. 
Hyde presiding. The court's Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and Amended Judgment were entered on October 23, 1989 
awarding landlord judgment of unpaid rent of $770, the full rent 
due under the parties1 original agreement for Jobe's tenancy,2 
denying any offsets and dismissing Jobe's counterclaim, holding 
that the CSPA did not apply to landlord/tenant transactions and, 
if it did, the landlord had not engaged in any deceptive or 
unconscionable acts here (R. 103-107, Appendix). This appeal 
followed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. THE CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT APPLIES TO 
RESIDENTIAL RENTAL TRANSACTIONS. 
A. Clear language of the act. 
1. § 13-11-3(2) defines consumer transaction as: 
A sale, lease, assignment, award 
by chance, or other written or 
oral transfer or disposition of 
goods, services or other 
property, both tangible and 
intangible (except securities and 
insurance), to a person for 
primarily personal family or 
household purposes. . . . It 
2
 Landlord sued for $1,335 (R. 1) an amount far in excess of 
what he was due under the parties1 agreement after deducting 
payments by Jobe evidenced by landlord's signed receipts 
(Defendant's Exhibits 1D-5D). 
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includes any offer or 
solicitation, any agreement any 
performance of an agreement with 
respect to any of these transfers 
or dispositions . . . 
The rental of a residence clearly falls within this 
broad definition, and none of the Act's explicit 
exemptions or exclusions applies. 
B. Appropriate construction and purpose of the consumers 
sales practices act supports application to residential 
rental transactions. 
§ 13-11-2 provides that: [the] act shall be construed 
liberally to promote the following policies: 
(1) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law 
governing consumer sales practices; 
(2) to protect consumers from suppliers who 
commit deceptive and unconscionable sales 
practices; 
(3) to encourage the development of fair 
consumer sales practices; 
(4) to make state regulation of consumer sales 
practices not inconsistent with the policies of 
the Federal Trade Commission Act relating to 
consumer protection; 
(5) to make uniform the law, including the 
administrative rules, with respect to the subject 
to this act among those states which enact 
similar laws; and 
(6) to recognize and protect suppliers who in 
good faith comply with the provisions of this 
act. [emphasis added] 
1. The modern view is that a renter is a consumer 
purchasing a bundle of goods and services, rights and 
obligations for exchange for rent. The goods and services 
purchased are a well known package which includes not merely 
walls and ceilings, but also adequate heat, light and a 
ventilation, serviceable plumbing facilities, secure windows 
and doors, proper sanitation, proper maintenance, etc. 
2. Federal precedent under the federal models for 
consumer protection laws support a holding that the laws cover 
the rental of residences. 
3. Courts of most other states have construed their 
consumer protection laws to apply to residential rental 
transactions. 
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II. THE RENTAL OF CONDEMNABLE PREMISES POSING A 
SUBSTANTIAL DANGER TO THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF 
THE OCCUPANTS AND UTILIZING A CONDEMNATION 
ORDER AS A MEANS OF EVICTION ARE DECEPTIVE OR 
UNCONSCIONABLE ACTS AND VIOLATIONS OF THE ACT. 
A. An unconscionable act or practice occurring before, 
during or after a [consumer] transaction is a violation. § 
13-11-5(1). 
B. The court should consider circumstances which the 
supplier knew or had reason to know, § 13-11-5(3) 
III. JOBE IS ENTITLED TO DAMAGES DUE TO LATENT 
DEFECTS THAT RENDERED THE PREMISES 
UNINHABITABLE. 
A. Utah should recognize a warranty of habitability. 
B. P.H. Investment v. Oliver, holding that the doctrine 
of caveat emptor prevents a renter from asserting an implied 
warranty of habitability, should not be applied to 
circumstances where the renter cannot detect unsafe, 
hazardous, or non-functioning conditions upon reasonable 
inspection before occupancy. 
C. Liability of the renter for payment for the rented 
premises should be offset or abated for periods during which 
the plumbing, lighting, heating, or other normal functions of 
the premises are inoperable. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE UTAH CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT APPLIES TO 
RESIDENTIAL RENTAL TRANSACTIONS. 
The Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act (CSPA) prohibits 
deceptive or unconscionable acts of a supplier in connection with 
a consumer transaction. Consumer transaction is broadly defined 
in Utah Code § 13-11-3(2) as: 
A sale, lease, assignment, award by chance, or other 
written or oral transfer or disposition of goods, 
services, or other property, both tangible and intangible 
(except securities and insurance), to a person for 
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primarily personal, family, or household 
purposes. . . . It includes any offier or solicitation, 
any agreement, any performance of an agreement with 
respect to any of these transfers ox\ dispositions . . . 
Rental of a residence falls comfortably within this definition, 
since a lease is often involved. However, even without a formal 
lease, the rental of a dwelling is a transaction by a consumer and 
is probably the most important transaction made by consumers other 
than the purchase of food. The acguisition of decent housing 
fundamentally affects the consumer's kell-being, health and 
personal sense of security. 
Landlord/tenant relations are increasingly being analyzed as 
contractual interactions and less as a transfer of a property 
interest. For example, the Utah Court of Appeals recently declared 
the rental of housing to be a consumer transaction: 
. . . housing today is a product bcpught by consumers, 
although its purchasers receive much less legal 
protection than purchasers of othef products. There 
seems to be no functional reason why the remedies for the 
sale of defective rental housing should be so much less 
than those for the sale of defective goods or services, 
and the importance of shelter as a necessity of life 
makes that disparity seem all the more anomalous."" 
The Act itself, Utah Code § 13-11-2, provides further guidance 
as to its construction and purpose: 
This act shall be construed liberall|y to promote 
the following policies: 
(1) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law 
governing consumer sales practices; . . . 
(4) to make state regulation of consumer sales practices 
not inconsistent with the policies o£ the Federal Trade 
Commission Act relating to consumer protection; . . . 
3
 P.H. Investment v. Oliver, 778 P.2d 11, 14 (Utah App. 1989), 
cert, granted, (Utah Sup. Ct. Oct. 4, 1989 (No. 890357), citations 
omitted. 
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(5) to make uniform the law, . . . ajnong those states 
which enact similar laws; . . . 
Consumer transaction is given a broad definition limited by the 
specific exclusions therein and the exemptions of specific types 
of transactions enumerated in § 13-lla-5. The Act should therefore 
be construed to include all consumer transactions except those 
explicitly excluded. The application of the Utah Consumer Sales 
Practices Act to residential rental transactions is wholely 
consistent with the purposes of the Act. Actually, the modern view 
of a residential rental transaction sees today's tenant as a 
consumer much like one who purchases a refrigerator or leases a 
car. 
In addition, the overwhelming weight of authority from both 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) precedent* and case law from other 
states indicate that rental of a residence should be viewed as a 
consumer transaction under the Utah Act. A local commentator, 
Brigham Young University Professor James H. Backman agrees. "It may 
well be that the residential tenant is the ultimate consumer. No 
other form of general consumption can match the expense, the 
4
 See FTC cases collected and analyzed in Commonwealth v. 
Monumental Properties, Inc., 459 Pa.450, 329 A.2d 812 (1974), 819-
820. 
"No support in the federal precursors of the 
Consumer Protection Law can be found for an 
exclusion for leasing from the Law's broad 
prohibition of unfair and deceptive practices in 
market transactions. On the other hand, the 
legislative history of, decisions interpreting, 
and FTC proceedings under section 5 of the FTC 
Act strongly counsel that the leasing of housing 
is covered by the Consumer Protection Law." 
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necessity, or the impact of housing on individuals. . . . Housing, 
like food and basic clothing, is indispehsable . . . there is no 
valid reason to distinguish consumer contracts and the contracts 
of tenants in the form of a residential lease." Backman, The 
Tenant as a Consumer? A Comparison of Developments in Consumer Law 
and in Landlord/Tenant Law, 33 Okla. L. Rev. 1, 44 (1980). 
This law is based closely on a model &ct, the Uniform Consumer 
Sales Practices Act, approved by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar 
Association in 1970 and 1971. This act and another similar uniform 
act, the Uniform Deceptive Practices Act, have been adopted in 
fifteen states. Our act was intended to be consistent with the law 
of other states adopting similar laws. Mo$t state courts presented 
with the question have found that rental of a residence is a 
consumer transaction falling within the ambit of that state's 
consumer protection laws. Utah should jo|Ln this trend. 
A leading case on the application of consumer protection laws 
to the landlord tenant context is Commonwealth v. Monumental 
Properties, Inc.5 There, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held 
that the Pennsylvania consumer protection law, which prohibited 
unfair or deceptive practices in trade or commerce, applied to a 
lease of residential property. The court reached this conclusion 
notwithstanding the fact that the Pennsylvania statute does not 
specifically mention leasing, and based its holding on the 
s
 Idi, 329 A.2d 812. 
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contemporary view of residential leases, a pragmatic and functional 
approach to the legislation and the consequences of a holding to 
the contrary.e 
The court noted that the modern apartment dweller is a 
consumer of housing services and adopted the "now classic" 
description of this economic reality appearing in Javins v. First 
National Realty Corp.; 
When American city dwellers, both rich and poor, seek 
" shelter^ , today, they seek a well known package of goods 
and services - a package which includes not merely walls 
and ceilings, but also adequate heat, light and 
ventilation, serviceable plumbing facilities, secure 
windows and doors, proper sanitation, and proper 
maintenance.7 
The court reasoned that the "purchaser of this bundle is as 
much a consumer as is the purchaser of an automobile, household 
appliance, or any other consumer goods.8 The court also noted that 
its interpretation of the consumer protection law was consistent 
with judicial and administrative interpretations of its federal 
precursor, the Federal Trade Commission Act, a position agreed to 
by the FTC which filed an amicus brief in that case.3 
North Carolina, Illinois, Texas, Connecticut, Massachusetts, 
New Jersey, Wisconsin, and both state and federal courts in 
6
 Id^, 329 A.2d at 820. 
7
 Id., 329 A.2d at 820, citing Javins v. First National Realty 
Corp., 138 U.S. App. D.C. 369, 428 F.2d 1071, 1074, cert, denied, 
400 U.S. 925, 91 S. Ct. 186, 27 L.Ed.2d 185 (1970). 
8
 Commonwealth 329 A.2d at 821. 
9
 Id., 329 A.2d at 818 - 20. 
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Michigan have reached a similar conclusion. See, Love v. Pressley, 
34 N.C. App. 503, 239 S.E.2d 574 (1977), appeal dismissed 294 N.C. 
441, 241 S.E.2d 843 (1978); Carter v. Mueller, 120 111. App.3d 314, 
457 N.E.2d 1335 (1983); Myers v. Ginsberg, 735 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. 
App. 1987); Conaway v. Prestia, 191 Conn. 484, 464 A.2d 847 (1983); 
McGrath v. Mishara, 386 Mass. 74, 434 N.E.2d 1215 (1982); 49> 
Prospect Street v. Sheva Gardens, Inc., 227 N.J. Super. 449, 547 
A.2d 1134 (1988); State v. Weller, 109 Wis.2d 665, 327 N.W.2d 172 
(1982); Smolen v. Dahlman Apartment, Ltd., 417 Mich. 1100, 338 
N.W.2d 892 (Mich. App. 1983); Rodriguez v. parry Brook Farms, Inc., 
672 F.Supp. 1009 (W.D. Mich. 1987). 
Two states have held that comprehensive landlord/tenant 
statutes precluded action under their consumer protection laws for 
deceptive acts by a landlord. In State v. Schwab, 693 P. 2d 108 
(Wash. 1985), the Supreme Court of Washington allowed recovery for 
city housing code violations under its landlord/tenant act/° but 
dismissed the state attorney general's complaint under its consumer 
protection statute seeking a determination that violations of its 
landlord/tenant act were per se violations of its consumer 
protection law. The court found that the landlord/tenant statute 
was intended by the legislature to be all encompassing and that the 
Washington consumer protection law, with a very specific and 
inclusionary definition list, (unlike Utah's broad definition) did 
not specifically include landlord/tenant relations. Because Utah 
10
 Utah has so far failed to grant such relief to its tenants. 
See P.H. Investment v. Oliver, 778 P.3d 11, 14. 
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has no comparable comprehensive landlord/tenant statute, this 
reasoning is of little precedential value for Utah. 
The Supreme Court of Kansas has also held the state's 
landlord/tenant statute displaces the consumer protection law in 
Chelsea Plaza Homes v. Moore, 226 Kan. 430, 601 P.2d 1100 (1979). 
The court reviewed the legislative history of the landlord/tenant 
statute in its analysis and found that it was intended to cover all 
the obligations, rights and remedies of both landlord and tenants. 
Since the landlord/tenant statute was more specific, the court 
found that it should override the less specific coverage of the 
consumer protection law. Again, since Utah has no comprehensive 
landlord/tenant statute, and in fact no statute at all dealing with 
obligations, rights or remedies of either landlord or tenant, this 
analysis is not helpful here. 
At least four states (in Myers, Conaway, McGrath, and Smolen, 
cited above) have applied their consumer protection laws to 
landlord/tenant relations notwithstanding the existence of 
comprehensive landlord/tenant statutes in those states. The 
consumer protection laws provide complementary protection for 
deceptive or unconscionable acts which cannot be anticipated by the 
legislature. The House Conference Report that accompanied the 
original passage of the FTC Act is instructive here. 
It is impossible to frame definitions which embrace all 
unfair practices. There is no limit to human 
inventiveness in this field. Even if all known unfair 
practices were specifically defined and prohibited, it 
would be at once necessary to begin over again. If 
12 
Congress were to adopt the method of definition, it would 
undertake an endless task. H.R. Co^f. Rep. No. 1142, 
63d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1914).11 
The trial court's conclusion that the ptah CSPA does not apply 
to landlord tenant agreements (R. 105, Conclusion No. 4) is subject 
to review for correctness here. Nephi Cijty v. Hansen, 779 P.2d 
673, 674 (Utah 1989). That conclusion constitutes an error of law 
and should be reversed by this court. Whether based simply on 
statutory analysis or on public poli<py, applying consumer 
protection statutes to landlord tenant relations is consistent with 
the trend in this court which has recognizee! the contractual nature 
of such relations (see, e.g., Reid v. Mutjual of Omaha Insurance 
Co. , 776 P.2d 896, 902 n.3 (Utah 1989)) ancfl with decisions in the 
overwhelming majority of other jurisdiction^ which have considered 
this issue, and is necessary to protect tenants in this state. 
POINT II. 
THE RENTAL OF CONDEMNABLE PREMISES POSING A SUBSTANTIAL 
DANGER TO THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF THE OCCUPANTS AND 
UTILIZING A CONDEMNATION ORDER AS A MEANS OF EVICTION 
ARE DECEPTIVE OR UNCONSCIONABLE ACTS AND VIOLATIONS OF 
THE UTAH CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACTn 
The Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act prohibits deceptive or 
unconscionable acts by suppliers.'2 Here Wade, a supplier (R. 103, 
Finding No. 2), rented premises that he knety or had reason to know 
11
 Cited in Commonwealth 329 A.3d at 83j8. 
17
 § 13-11-5(1) provides that an unconscionable act or practice 
accruing before, during, or after a transaction is a violation. 
§ 13-11-5(3) provides that the court should consider circumstances 
which the supplier knew or had reason to know. 
13 
had a serious plumbing problem, namely a nonexistent or inadequate 
sewer connection and numerous other problems. These problems 
existed throughout Jobe's tenancy (Tr. 29, 42). Witness Diane 
Copeland, an Ogden City building inspector, as well as Jobe herself 
testified with respect to the extent and duration of the problems 
on the property (Tr. 34, 38). The trial court found that Jobe's 
tenancy terminated on December 13, 1988, when the premises were 
found to be unsafe for human occupation (Tr. 40, R. 104, Finding 
No. 4). On that day Wade was pumping raw sewage from Jobe's 
basement into the street (Tr. 37). Apparently he even realized the 
seriousness of the condition, since he testified that nthe place 
wasn't sanitary at that point on" (Tr. 57). Landlord's duty at 
this point was to immediately repair the problem and restore the 
premises to a fit condition. His failure to do so constitutes a 
deceptive or unconscionable act or practice under CSPA. 
The trial court found that "the evidence would not warrant a 
finding of any deceptive act or practice on the part of the 
landlord, as contemplated by the Consumer Sales Practices Act" (R. 
105, Conclusion No. 5).13 Yet renting an apartment with problems 
of this severity and refusing to fix the most disturbing problem, 
the accumulation of raw sewage in the basement to a depth that 
extinguished the water heater, is deception. The CSPA provides an 
example of a deceptive act which may be relevant here: if a 
Utah Code § 13-11-5(2) provides that "[t]he 
unconscionability of an act or practice is a question of law for 
the court." 
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supplier "indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction is 
of a particular standard, quality, grade, style, or model, if it 
is not,n the supplier has engaged in a deceptive act. Utah Code 
§ 13-11-4(2)(b). Renting an apartment includes a representation 
implied or actual that there will not be standing water full of raw 
sewage in the basement, that there will be hot water and that there 
will not be foul odors permeating the residence. Landlord failed 
to disclose the existence of these problems and failed to repair 
them when brought to his attention. His actions are no different 
than the shady used car dealer who knows of but "forgets" to advise 
a consumer that the transmission is seriou$ly defective on a used 
car which is for sale. That is clearly a deceptive act. So are the 
landlord's activities here. 
It also seems apparent that the landlord's failure to repair 
the major health hazard present, the sewage problem, is 
unconscionable. Landlord testified that he is a plumber (Tr. 56) 
and is intimately familiar with the building. He claimed that he 
made efforts to repair the problem but finally gave up and called 
the building inspector and "ordered them to condemn the place so 
she would move out" (Tr. 57). These acts must surely shock the 
conscious of the court. An unconscionable contract has been 
defined by the Utah courts as one in which Mno decent, fair minded 
person would view the ensuing result without being possessed of a 
profound sense of injustice." Resource Management Co. v. Weston 
Ranch and Livestock Company, Inc., 706 P.2d 1028, 1041 (Utah 1985) 
citations omitted. 
15 
Likewise, and perhaps even more offensive, is the landlord's 
direct admission that he did not fix the sewage problem, called the 
Ogden City Inspection Department and "ordered them" to condemn the 
property because he "wanted her to be out in a hurry" (Tr. 57). 
He succeeded. The trial court found that she was evicted on 
December 13, 1988 by the Ogden City Inspection Division (R. 105, 
Conclusion No. 2). This abuse of the building inspection process 
and admitted conscious decision to evade the statutory eviction 
procedures is also both deceptive and unconscionable. Such actions 
clearly violate Utah Code § 78-36-121* and the public policy to 
avoid self-help evictions articulated in Pentecost v. Harward, 699 
P.2d 696, 699-700 (Utah 1985). Since the act provides that the 
unconscionability of an act or practice is a question of law for 
the courts, this court is free to review the record and make its 
own determination with respect to this issue. 
Jobe is entitled to the relief provided in the act 1S for these 
deceptive and unconscionable acts of the landlord. This court 
should reverse the trial court's determination that none of 
landlord's actions were deceptive or unconscionable. 
1A
 Utah Code § 78-36-12 provides that: 
It is unlawful for an owner to willfully 
exclude a tenant from the tenant's premises in 
any manner except by judicial process . . . 
AS
 §§ 13-11-19(2) and (5). 
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POINT III, 
JOBE IS ENTITLED TO DAMAGES DUE TO LATENT DEFECTS THAT 
RENDERED THE PREMISES UNINHABITABLE. 
Having lived above a virtual cess po01 for a period of five 
months, and enduring "a couple of dozen" substandard conditions 
"varying from minor to significant enough to require the place to 
be vacated" (Tr. 39) , Jobe was charged by tlie trial court with full 
payment of rent for the entire period of her tenancy. The court 
apparently relied on P.H. Investment v. Ojliver, which held that 
Utah does not recognize an implied warranty of habitability in 
residential rental agreements but instead continues to endorse the 
doctrine of caveat emptor. The most shocking implication of the 
trial court's decision is that even the efforts that the landlord 
did make to remedy the problem, pumping th$ raw sewage out of the 
basement into the street on several occasions so that the water 
heater could be relit, was not required und^r the law. He need not 
have done anything at all until cited by the building inspector and 
even then would apparently be entitled to Collect full rent from 
Jobe. 
The trial court determined that Jobers liability for rent 
commenced on July 14, 1988 and terminated on December 13, 1988, 
when she was ordered to vacate by the building inspector but denied 
her any offsets in her rental obligation (H. 104-5, Finding No. 8 
and Conclusion No. 6). Tenant's only solution to these problems was 
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to move, incurring the substantial investment in time, energy, and 
money which a move requires. Yet there is ample authority under 
the common law to afford her some relief. 
In connection with its discussion of unfair and deceptive 
practices, the Commonwealth court cited Dean Prosser for the 
proposition that: 
The lessor, like a vendor, is under the obligation to 
disclose to the lessee concealed dangerous conditions 
existing when possession is transferred, of which he has 
knowledge. There is "something like fraud1' in a failure 
to give warning of a known hidden danger to one who 
enters upon the assumption that it does not exist; and 
the lessor will be liable to the lessee or to members of 
his family for his non-disclosure. 
W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 401 (4th ed. 1971). 
It is highly unlikely that the landlord, a plumber (Tr. 56), 
was unaware of the numerous plumbing and other problems cited by 
the building inspector when he rented the apartment to tenant. It 
is a much more reasonable interpretation of the facts that these 
conditions were known to him when the tenant inspected the premises 
and throughout her tenancy. Especially with regard to the sewer 
connection problem, Jobe should not be responsible for this problem 
since the water was not connected at the time the rental agreement 
was entered into (R. 104, Finding No. 3, Tr. 30-31). 
This court should recognize a warranty of habitability in Utah 
and determine tenant's rent obligation to landlord, if any, after 
offsetting all contractual defense claims that tenant may have. 
A large number of other state courts have recognized a warranty of 
habitability and have explored a tenant's contract remedies, 
18 
concluding that among others, tenants should be allowed to claim 
a retroactive rent abatement or other damages for a landlord's 
failure to comply with applicable building and health codes. See 
Green v. Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco, 
111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 517 P.2d 1168 (1974); ^ oston Housing Authority 
v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831 (Mass. 1973); ^ >ugh v. Holmes, 405 A.2d 
897 (Pa. 1979); Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202 (Vt. 1984); and 
King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. App. 1973). 
Alternatively, but clearly less satisfactory, this court 
should make a judicial exception to the dolctrine of caveat emptor 
where conditions affecting habitability ar0 not readily detectable 
by the tenant. Here, for example, there was no way for Jobe to 
know at the time she entered into the rental agreement that there 
was a defective sewer connection. And even during her tenancy, 
there was no way by ordinary inspection to determine the reason 
that she was without hot water and forced to live with offensive 
odors. 
Even in the few states that continue to endorse caveat emptor 
such an exception has been made "where the defect was allegedly 
unknown to the tenant, was known to the landlord, and was not 
ascertainable upon ordinary inspection" B^ackwell v. Del Bosco, 
558 P.2d 563, 565 n.l (Colo. 1976).le Applying this analysis, 
tenants have been awarded damages under usual contract remedy 
theories, the most common being the benefit of the bargain rule, 
16
 See also Wanland v. Beavers, 474 N.E.2d 1327 (111. App. 
1985) and Taylor v. Leedy, 412 So.2d 763 (Ala. 1982). 
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awarding the difference between what the tenant actually received 
and what should have been received. See R. Schoshinski, American 
Law of Landlord and Tenant 111-12 (1980). Here that would have 
been an offset based on the rental value of an apartment with hot 
water and a normally functioning toilet and without dangerous 
electrical and other problems and offensive odors, compared to what 
Jobe received here. 
CONCLUSION 
The language of the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act, case 
law from other states, prior related decisions of this court and 
sound public policy all dictate that the Act apply to 
landlord/tenant agreements and relations. 
This court should determine that the rental of premises which 
are in substantial violation of building codes and pose a 
substantial hazard to the health and safety to its occupants and 
the use of the building inspection and closure process to evict a 
tenant constitute deceptive or unconscionaible acts or practices 
under the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act. Jobe is entitled to 
damages pursuant to the Act. 
In the alternative, Jobe is entitled to an offset against any 
rent owed to compensate her for the numerous building code 
violations, where the conditions were not readily detectable by 
her and were known to landlord, either under a theory of breach of 
20 
the landlord's implied warranty of habitability or as an exception 
to the rule of caveat emptor. The judgment of the district court 
should be reversed. 
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13-11-1. Citation of act. 
This act shall be known and may he cited as the 
"Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act." 1»73 
13-11-2. Construction and purposes of act. 
This act shall be construed libeially to promote the 
following policies: 
(1) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law 
governing consumer sales practices; 
(2) to protect consumers from suppliers who 
commit deceptive and unconscionable bales prac-
tices; 
(3) to encourage the development o( fair con-
sumer sales practices; 
(4) to make state negulation of consumer sales 
practices not inconsistent with the policies of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act relating to con-
sumer protection; 
(5) to make uniform the law, including the ad-
ministrative rules, with respect to the subject of 
this act among those states which enact similar 
laws; and 
(6) to recognize and protect suppliers who in 
good faith comply with the provisions of this act. 
1W73 
13-11-3. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Charitable solicitation" means any re-
quest directly or indirectly for money, credit, 
property, financial assistance, or any other thing 
of value on the plea or representation that it will 
be used for a charitable purpose. A charitable 
solicitation may be made in any manner, includ-
ing: 
(a) any oral or written request, including 
a telephone request; 
(b) the distribution, circulation, or posting 
of any handbill, written advertisement, ur 
publication; 
(c) the sale of, offer or attempt to sell, or 
request of donations for any book, card, 
chance, coupon, device, magazine, member-
ship, merchandise, subscription, ticket, 
flower, flag, button, sticker, ribbon, token, 
trinket, tag, souvenir, candy, or any other 
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article in connection with which any appeal 
is made for any charitable purpose, or where 
the name of any charitable organization or 
movement is used or referred to as an in-
ducement or reason for making any purchase 
donation, or where, in connection with any 
sale or donation, any statement is made that 
the whole or any part of the proceeds of any 
sale or donation will go to or be donated to 
any charitable purpose. A charitable solicita-
tion is considered complete when made, 
whether or not the organization or person 
making the solicitation receives any contri-
bution or makes any sale. 
(2) "Consumer transaction" means a sale, 
lease, assignment, award by chance, or other 
written or oral transfer or disposition of goods, 
services, or other property, boih tangible and in-
tangible (except securities and insurance), to a 
person for primarily personal, family, or house-
hold purposes, or for purposes that relate to a 
business opportunity that requires both his ex-
penditure of money or property and his personal 
services on a continuing basis and in which he 
has not been previously engaged, or a solicitation 
or offer by a supplier with respect to any of these 
transfers or dispositions. It includes any offer or 
solicitation, any agreement, any performance of 
an agreement with respect to any of these trans-
fers or dispositions, and any charitable solicita-
tion as defined in this section. 
(3) "Enforcing authority" means the Division 
of Consumer Protection. 
(4) "Final judgment" means a judgment, in-
cluding any supporting opinion, that determines 
the rights of the parties and concerning which 
appellate remedies have been exhausted or the 
time for appeal has expired. 
(5) "Person" means an individual, corporation, 
government, governmental subdivision or 
agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, 
association, cooperative, or any other legal en-
tity. 
(6) "Supplier" means a seller, lessor, assignor, 
offeror, broker, or other person who jegularly so-
licits, engages in, or enforces consumer transac-
tions, whether or not he deals directly with the 
consumer. 1987 
13-11-4. Deceptive act or p rac t ice by supplier. 
(1) A deceptive act or practice by a supplier in con-
nection with a consumer transaction violates this 
chapter whether it occurs before, during, or after the 
transaction. 
(2) Without limiting the scope of Subsection (1), a 
supplier commits a deceptive act or practice if the 
supplier, with intent to deceive: 
(a) indicates that the subject of a consumer 
transaction has sponsorship, approval, perfor-
mance characteristics, accessories, uses, or bene-
fits, if it has not; 
(b) indicates that the subject of a consumer 
transaction is of a particular standard, quality, 
grade, style, or model, if it is not; 
(c) indicates that the subject of a consumer 
transaction is new, or unused, if it is not, or has 
been used to an extent that is materially differ-
ent from the fact; 
(d) indicates that the subject of a consumer 
transaction is available to (he consumer for a 
reason that does not exist; 
(e) indicates that the subject of a consumer 
transaction has been supplied in accordance with 
a previous representation, if it has not; 
(f) indicates that the subject of a consumer 
transaction will be supplied in greater quantity 
than the supplier intends; 
(g) ind cates that replacement or repair is 
needed, if it is not; 
(h) ind cates that a specific price advantage 
exists, if it does not; 
(i) indicates that the supplier has a sponsor-
ship, approval, or affiliation he does not have; 
(j) indicates that a consumer transaction in-
volves or does not involve a warranty, a dis-
claimer of warranties, particular warranty 
terms, or other rights, remedies, or obligations, if 
the representation is false; 
(k) indicates that the consumer will receive a 
rebate, discount, or other benefit as an induce-
ment for entering into a consumer transaction in 
return for giving the supplier the names of pro-
spective consumers or otherwise helping the sup-
plier to enter into other consumer transactions, if 
receipt of the benefit is contingent on an event 
occurring after the consumer enters into the 
transaction; 
(I) after receipt of payment for goods or ser-
vices, fails to ship the goods or furnish the ser-
vices within the lime advertised or otherwise 
represented or, if no specific time is advertised or 
represented, fails to ship the goods or furnish the 
services within 30 days, unless within the appli-
cable time] period the supplier provides the buyer 
with the olption to either cancel the sales agree-
ment and receive a refund of all previous pay-
ments to the supplier or to extend the shipping 
date to a specific date proposed by the supplier, 
but any refund shall be mailed or delivered to the 
buyer within ten business days after the seller 
receives written notification from the buyer of 
the buyer's right to cancel the sales agreement 
and receive the refund; 
(m) fails to furnish a notice of the purchaser's 
right to cancel a direct solicitation sale within 
three business days at the time of purchase if the 
sale is made other than at the supplier's estab-
lished place of business pursuant to the supplier's 
mail, telephone, or personal contact and if the 
sale price pxceeds $25, which notice shall be a 
conspicuous statement written in bold type, in 
immediate I proximity to the space reserved for 
the signature of the buyer, as follows: "YOU, 
THE BUYER, MAY CANCEL THIS CON-
TRACT AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO MIDNIGHT 
OF THE THIRD BUSINESS DAY AFTER THE 
DATE OF THE TRANSACTION."; 
(n) promotes, offers, or grants participation in 
a pyramid Scheme as defined under Chapter 6a, 
Title 76; oJ-
(o) represents that the funds or property con-
veyed in response to a charitable solicitation will 
be donated or used for a particular purpose or 
will be donated to or used by a particular organi-
zation, if th<t representation is false. i»87 
13-11-5. Unconscionable act or practice by sup-
plier 
(1) An unconscionable act or practice by a supplier 
in connection with a consumer transaction violates 
this act whether! it occurs before, during, or after the 
transaction. 
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(2) The unconscionability of an act or practice is a 
question of law for the court. If it is claimed or ap-
pears to the court that an act or practice may be un-
conscionable, the parties shall be given a reasonable 
opportunity to present evidence as to its setting, pur-
pose, and effect to aid the court in making its deter-
mination. 
(3) In determining whether an act or practice is 
Unconscionable, the court shall consider circum-
stances which the supplier knew or had reason to 
know. 1973 
13-11-6. Ju r i sd ic t ion of dis t r ic t cour ts — Ser-
vice of process . 
(1) The district courts of this state have jurisdic-
tion over any supplier as to any act or practice in this 
state governed by this act or as to any claim arising 
from a consumer transaction subject to this act. 
(2) In addition to any other method provided by 
rule or statute, personal jurisdiction over a supplier 
may be acquired in a civil action or proceeding insti-
tuted in the district court by the service of process in 
the following manner. If a supplier engages in any act 
or practice in this state governed by this act, or en-
gages in a consumer transaction subject to this act, he 
may designate an agent upon whom service of process 
may be made in this state. The agent must be a resi-
dent of or a corporation authorized to do business in 
this state. The designation muni he in writing and 
filed with the Division of Corporations and Commer-
cial Code. If no designation is made and filed, or if 
process cannot be served in this state upon the desig-
nated agent, whether or not the supplier is a resident 
of this state or is authorized to do business in this 
state, process may be served upon the director of the 
Division of Corporations and Commercial Code, but 
service upon him is not effective unless the plaintiff 
promptly mails a copy of the process and pleadings by 
registered or certified mail to the defendant at his 
last reasonably ascertainable address. An affidavit of 
compliance with this section must be filed with the 
clerk of the court on or before the return day of the 
process, if any, or within any future time the court 
allows. i984 
13-11-7. Duties of enforcing au thor i ty — Confi-
dent ia l i ty of identi ty of persons inves-
t igated — Civil penal ty for violation of 
r e s t r a in ing or injunctive o rders . 
(1) The enforcing authority shall: 
(a) enforce this chapter throughout the state; 
(b) cooperate with state and local officials, offi-
cials of other states, and officials of the federal 
government in the administration of comparable 
statutes; 
(c) inform consumers and suppliers on a con-
tinuing basis of the provisions of this chapter and 
of acts or practices that violate this chapter in-
cluding mailing information concerning final 
judgments to persons who request it, for which he 
may charge a reasonable fee to cover the ex-
pense; 
(d) receive and act on complaints; and 
(e) maintain a public file of final judgments 
rendered under this chapter that have been ei-
ther reported officially or made available for pub-
lic dissemination under Subsection (l)(c), final 
consent judgments, and to the extent the enforc-
ing authority considers appropriate, assurances 
of voluntary compliance. 
(2) In carrying out his duties, the enforcing author-
ity may not publicly disclose the identity of a person 
investigated unless his identify has become a matter 
of public record in an enforcement proceeding or he 
has consented to public disclosure. 
(3) On motion of the enforcing authority, or on its 
own motion, the court may impose a civil penalty of 
not more than $5,000 for each day a temporary re-
straining order, preliminary injunction, or perma-
nent injunction issued under this chapter is violated, 
if the supplier received notice of the restraining or 
injunctive order. Civil penalties imposed under this 
section shall be paid to the General Fund. 19S7 
13-11-8. Power s of enforcing author i ty . 
(1) The enforcing authority may conduct research, 
hold public hearings, make inquiries, and publish 
studies relating to consumer sales acts or practices. 
(2) The enforcing authority shall adopt substantive 
rules that prohibit with specificity acts or practices 
that violate Section 13-11-4 and appropriate proce-
dural rules. 1973 
13-11-9. Rule-making requ i rement s . 
(1) In addition to complying with other rule-mak-
ing requirements imposed by this act, the enforcing 
authority shall: 
(a) adopt as a rule a description of the organi-
zation of his office, stating the general course and 
method of operation of his office and method 
whereby the public may obtain information or 
make submissions or requests; 
(b) adopt rules of practice setting forth the na-
ture and requirements of all formal and informal 
procedures available, including a description of 
the forms and instructions used by the enforcing 
authority of his office; and 
(c) make available for public inspection all 
rules, written statements of policy, ami interpre-
tations formulated, adopted, or used by the en-
forcing authority in discharging his functions. 
(2) A rule of the enforcing authority is invalid, and 
may not be invoked by the enforcing authority for 
any purpose, until it has been made available for pub-
lic inspection under Subsection »1>. This provision 
does not apply to a person who has knowledge of a 
rule before engaging in an act or practice that vio-
lates this act. 1973 
13-11-10 to 13-11-15. Repealed. 19S3,19S8 
13-11-16. Inves t igatory powers of enforcing au-
thority. 
(1) If, by his own inquiries or as a result of com-
plaints, the enforcing authority has reason to believe 
that a person has engaged in, U engaging in, or is 
about to engage in an act or practice that violates this 
act, he may administer oaths and affirmations, sub-
poena witnesses or matter, and colled evidence. 
(2) If matter that the enforcing authority sub-
poenas is located outside this stale, the person sub-
poenaed may either make it available to the enforc-
ing authority at a convenient location within the 
state or pay the reasonable and necessary expenses 
for the enforcing authority or his representative to 
examine the matter at the place where it is located. 
The enforcing authority may designate representa-
tives, including officials of the state in which the mat-
ter is located, to inspect the matter on his behalf, and 
he may respond to similar requests from officials of 
other states. 
(3) Upon failure of a person without lawful excuse 
to obey a subpoena and upon reasonable notice to all 
persons affected, the enforcing authonty may apply 
to the court for an order compelling compliance. 
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(4) The enforcing authority may request that an 
individual who refuses to comply with a subpoena on 
the ground that testimony or matter may incriminate 
him be ordered by the court to provide the testimony 
or matter. Except in a prosecution for perjury, an in-
dividual who complies with a court order to provide 
testimony or matter after asserting a privilege 
against self-incrimination to which he is entitled by 
law, may not be subjected to a criminal proceeding or 
to a civil penalty to the transaction concerning which 
he is required to testify or produce relevant matter. 
This subsection does not apply to damages recover-
able under Section 13-11-19(2) or to civil sanctions 
imposed under Section 13-11-17(1 Kb). 1973 
13-11-17. Actions by enforcing au thor i ty . 
(1) The enforcing authority may bring an action: 
(a) to obtain a declaratory judgment that an 
act or practice violates this chapter; 
(b) to enjoin, in accordance with the principles 
of equity, a supplier who has violated, is violat-
ing, or is otherwise likely to violate this chapter; 
and 
(c) to recover, for each violation, actual dam-
ages, or obtain relief under Subsection (2)(b), on 
behalf of consumers who complained to the en-
forcing authority within a reasonable time after 
it instituted proceedings under this chapter. 
(2) (a) The enforcing authority may bring a class 
action on behalf of consumers for the actual dam-
ages caused by an act or practice specified as vio-
lating this chapter in a rule adopted by the en-
forcing authority under Section I Subsection] 
13-11-8(2) before the consumer transactions on 
which the action is based, or declared to violate 
Section 13-11-4 or 13-11-5 by final judgment of 
courts of general jurisdiction and appellate 
courts of this state that was either reported offi-
cially or made available for public dissemination 
under Section [Subsectionl 13-1 l-7(l)(c) by the 
enforcing authority ten days before the consumer 
transactions on which the action is based, or, 
with respect to a supplier who agreed to it, was 
prohibited specifically by the terms of a consent 
judgment that became final before the consumer 
transactions on which the action is based. 
(b) On motion of the enforcing authority and 
without bond in an action under this subsection, 
the court may make appropriate orders, includ-
ing appointment of a master or receiver or se-
questration of assets, but only if it appears that 
the defendant is threatening or is about to re-
move, conceal or dispose of his property to the 
damage of persons for whom relief is requested, 
to reimburse consumers found to have been dam-
aged, or to carry out a transaction in accordance 
with consumers' reasonable expectations, or to 
strike or limit the application of unconscionable 
clauses of contracts to avoid an unconscionable 
result, or to grant other appropriate relief. The 
court may assess the expenses of a master or re-
ceiver against a supplier. 
(c) If an act or practice that violates this chap-
ter unjustly enriches a supplier and damages can 
be computed with reasonable certainty, damages 
recoverable on behalf of consumers who cannot 
• be located with due diligence shall be transferred 
to the state treasurer pursuant to the Uniform 
Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act. 
(d) If a supplier shows by a preponderance of 
• the evidence that a violation of this chapter re-
sulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the 
maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to 
avoid the error, recovery under this subsection is 
limited |to the amount, if any, by which the sup-
plier wks unjustly enriched by the violation. 
(e) No action may be brought by the enforcing 
authority under this subsection more than two 
years after the occurrence of a violation of this 
chapter. 
(3) The enforcing authority may terminate an in-
vestigation 6r an action other than a class action 
upon acceptance of the supplier's written assurance of 
voluntary compliance with this chapter. Acceptance 
of an assurance may be conditioned on a commitment 
to reimburse consumers or take other appropriate 
corrective action. An assurance is not evidence of a 
prior violation of this chapter. Unless an assurance 
has been rescinded by agreement of the parties or 
voided by a ccburt for good cause, subsequent failure to 
comply with ^he terms of an assurance is prima facie 
evidence of a violation. 19HJ 
13-11-17.5. posts and attorney's fees. 
Any judgment granted in favor of the enforcing au-
thority in connection with the enforcement of this 
chapter shall include, in addition to any other mone-
tary award or injunctive relief, an award of reason-
able attorneyfs [cts, court costs, and costs of investi-
gation. 19*7 
13-11-18. Noncompl iance by suppl ier subject to 
o ther s ta te supervis ion — Co-opera-
tion of enforcing au thor i ty and other 
official o r agency. 
(1) If the enforcing authority received a complaint 
or other information relating to noncompliance with 
this act by a sjupplier who is subject to other supervi-
sion in this state, the enforcing authority shall in-
form the official or agency having that supervision. 
The enforcing authority may request information 
about suppliers from the official or agency. 
(2) The enforcing authority and any other official 
or agency in this state having supervisory authority 
over a supplier shall consult and assist each other in 
maintaining Compliance with this act. Within the 
scope of their authority, they may jointly or sepa-
rately make investigations, prosecute suits, and take 
other official aption they consider appropriate. 1&73 
13-11-19. Act ions by consumer . 
(1) Whether he seeks or is entitled to damages or 
otherwise has Ian adequate remedy at law, a con-
sumer may br^ng an action to: 
(a) obtain a declaratory judgment that an act 
or practice violates this chapter; and 
(b) enjoin, in accordance with the principles of 
equity, a supplier who has violated, is violating, 
or is likely to violate this chapter. 
(2) A consumer who suffers loss as a result of a 
violation of thjs chapter may recover, but not in a 
class action, actual damages or $2,000, whichever is 
greater, plus court costs. 
(3) Whether a consumer seeks or is entitled to re-
cover damages or has an adequate remedy at law, he 
may bring a class action for declaratory judgment, an 
injunction, andi appropriate ancillary relief against 
an act or practice that violates this chapter. 
(4) (a) A consumer who suffers loss as a result of a 
violation of] this chapter may bring a class action 
for the actiial damages caused by an act or prac-
tice specified as violating this chapter by a rule 
adopted by the enforcing authority under Section 
(Subsectionl 13-11-8(2) before the consumer 
transactions on which the action is based, or de-
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clared to violate Section 13-11-4 or 13-11-5 by a 
final judgment of the appropriate court or courts 
of genera) jurisdiction and appellate courts of 
this state that was either officially reported or 
made available for public dissemination under 
Section ISubsectionl 13 ll-7(l)(c) by the enforc-
ing authority ten days before the consumer 
transactions on which the action is based, or with 
respect to a supplier who agreed to it, was prohib-
ited specifically by the terms of a consent judg-
ment which became final before the consumer 
transactions on which the action is based 
(b) If an act or practice that violates this chap-
ter unjustly enriches a supplier and the damages 
can be computed with reasonable certainty, dam-
ages recoverable on behalf of consumers who can-
not be located with due diligence shall be trans-
ferred to the state treasurer pursuant to the Uni-
form Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act 
(c) If a supplier shows by a preponderance of 
the evidence that a violation of this chapter re-
sulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the 
maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to 
avoid the error, recovery under this section is 
limited to the amount, if any, in which the sup-
plier was unjustly enriched by the violation 
(5) Except for services performed by the enforcing 
authority, the court may award to the prevailing 
party a reasonable attorney's fee limited to the woik 
reasonably performed if 
(a) the consumer complaining of the act or 
practice that violates this chapter has brought or 
maintained an action he knew to be groundless, 
or a supplier has committed an act or practice 
that violates this chaptei, and 
(b) an action under this section has been ter-
minated by a judgment or required by the court 
to be settled under Section ISubsectionl 
13 ll-21(l)(a) 
(6) Except for consent judgment entered before tes-
timony is taken, a final judgment in favor of the en-
forcing authority under Section 13-11 17 is admissi-
ble as prima facie evidence of the facts on which it is 
based in later proceedings under this section against 
the same person or a person in privity with him 
(7) When a judgment under this section becomes 
final, the prevailing party shall mail a copy to the 
enforcing authority for inclusion in the public file 
maintained under Section (Subsectionl 13 11 7(1 He) 
(8) An action under this section must be brought 
within two years after occurrence of a violation of this 
chapter, or within one year after the termination of 
proceedings by the enforcing authority with respect 
to a violation of this chapter, whichever is later 
When a supplier sues a consumer, he may assert as a 
counterclaim any claim under this chapter arising 
out of the transaction on which suit is brought IBS3 
13-11-20. Class actions. 
(1) An action may be maintained as a class action 
under this act only if 
(a) the class is so numerous that joinder of all 
members is impracticable, 
(b) there are questions of law or fact common 
to the class, 
(c) the claims or defenses of the representative 
parties are t> pical of the claims or defenses of the 
class, 
(d) the representative parties will fairly and 
adequately protect the interests of the class, and 
(e) either 
(l) the prosecution of separate actions by 
or against individual meinbeis of the class 
would create a riak ot 
(aa) inconsistent or varying adjudica-
tions with respect to individual mem-
bers of the class which would establish 
lncompat ble standaids of conduct for 
the party opposing the class, or 
(bb) adjudications with respect to in-
dividual members of the class that 
would as a practical matter dispose of 
the interests of the other members not 
parties tc the adjudications or substan-
tially impair or impede their ability to 
protect their interests, or 
(u) the party opposing the class has acted 
or refused to act on grounds generally appli-
cable to the class, thereby making appropri-
ate final injunctive relief or corresponding 
declaratory relief with respect to the class as 
a whole, or 
(in) the court finds that the questions of 
law or fact common to the membeis of the 
class predominate over any questions affect-
ing only individual members and that a 
class action is superior to other available 
methods for the fair and efficient adjudica-
tion of the contioversy 
(2) The matters pertinent to the findings under 
Subsection (l)(e)(iiu include 
(a) the interest of members of the class in indi-
vidually controlling the prosecution or defense of 
separate actions, 
(b) the extent and nature of any litigation con-
cerning the controversy already commenced by 
or against members of the class, 
(c) the desirability or undesirabihty of concen-
trating the litigation of the claims in the particu-
lar forum, and 
(d) the difficulties likely to be encountered in 
the management of a class action 
(3) As soon as practicable after the commencement 
of an action brought as a class action, the couit shall 
determine by order whether it is to be so maintained 
An order under this subsection may be conditional, 
and it may be amended before decision on the merits 
(4) In a class action maintained under Subsection 
(l)(e) the court may direct to the members of the class 
the best notice practicable under the circumstances, 
including individual notice to each member who can 
be identified through reasonable effort '1 he notice 
shall advise each member that 
(a) the court will exclude him from the class, 
unless he requests inclusion, by a specified date, 
(b) the judgment, whether favorable or not, 
will include all members who request inclusion, 
and 
(c) a member who requests inclusion may, if he 
desires, enter an appearance thiough his counsel 
(5) When appropriate, an action may be brought or 
maintained as a class action with respect to particu-
lar issues, or a class may be divided into subclasses 
and each subclass treated as a class 
(6) In the conduct of a class action the court may 
make appropriate orders 
(a) determining the course of proceedings or 
prescribing measures to prevent undue repetition 
or complication in the presentation of evidence or 
argument, 
(b) requiring, for the protection of the mem-
bers of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct 
of the action, that notice be given in the manner 
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the court directs to some or all of the members or 
to the enforcing authority of any step in the ac-
tion, or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or 
of the opportunity of members to signify whether 
they consider the representation fair and ade-
quate, to intervene and present claims or de-
fenses, or otherwise to come into the action; 
(c) imposing conditions on the representative 
parties or on intervenors; 
(d) requiring that the pleadings be amended to 
eliminate allegations as to representation of ab-
sent persons, and that the action proceed accord-
ingly; or 
(e) dealing with similar procedural matters. 
(7) A class action shall not be dismissed or compro-
mised without approval of the court. Notice of the 
proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to 
all members of the class as the court directs. 
(8) The judgment in an action maintained as a 
class action under Subsection (l)(e)(i) or (ii), whether 
or not favorable to the class, shall describe those 
whom the court finds to be members of the class. The 
judgment in a class action under Subsection (D(eHiii), 
whether or not favorable to the class, shall specify or 
describe those to whom the notice provided in Subsec-
tion (d) was directed, and who have requested inclu-
sion, and whom the court finds to be members of the 
Class. 1974 
13-11-21. Settlement of class action — Com-
plaint in class action delivered to en-
forcing authority. 
(1) (a) A defendant in a class action may file a 
written offer of settlement. If it is not accepted 
within a reasonable time by a plaintiff class rep-
resentative, the defendant may file an affidavit 
reciting the rejection. The court may determine 
that the offer has enough merit to present to the 
members of the class. If it so determines, it shall 
order a hearing to determine whether the offer 
should be approved. It shall give the best notice 
of the hearing that is practicable under the cir-
cumstances, including notice to each member 
who can be identified through reasonable effort. 
The notice shall specify the terms of the offer and 
a reasonable period within which members of the 
class who request it are entitled to be included in 
the class. The statute of limitations for those who 
are excluded pursuant to this subsection is tolled 
for the period the class action has been pending, 
plus an additional year. 
(b) If a member who has previously lost an op-
portunity to be excluded from the class is ex-
cluded at his request in response to notice of the 
offer of settlement during the period specified un-
der Paragraph (a), he may not thereafter partici-
pate in a class action for damages respecting the 
same consumer transaction, unless the court 
later disapproves the offer of settlement or ap-
proves a settlement materially different from 
that proposed in the original offer of settlement. 
Alter the expiration of the period of limitations, a 
member of the class is not entitled to be excluded 
from it. 
(c) If the court later approves the offer of set-
tlement, including changes, if any, required by 
the court in the interest of a just settlement of 
the action, it shall enter judgment, which is bind-
ing on all persons who are then members of the 
class. If the court disapproves the offer or ap-
proves a settlement materially different from 
that proposed in the original offer, notice shall be 
given to a person who was excluded from the ac-
tion at his request in response to notice of the 
offer uncker paragraph (a), and he is entitled to 
rejoin the class and, in the case of the approval, 
participate in the settlement. 
(2) On thei commencement of a class action under 
Section 13-11-19, the class representative shall mail 
by certified n)ail with return receipt requested or per-
sonally serve! a copy of the complaint on the enforcing 
authority. W|ithin thirty days after the receipt of a 
copy of the cimplaint, but not thereafter, the enforc-
ing authority may intervene in the class action. 1973 
13-11-22. Exemptions from application of act 
(1) This ac|t does not apply to: 
(a) an I act or practice required or specifically 
permitted by or under federal law, or by or under 
state law; 
(b) a publisher, broadcaster, printer, or other 
person engaged in the dissemination of informa-
tion or tpe reproduction of printed or pictorial 
matter so far as the information or matter has 
been disseminated or reproduced on behalf of 
others without actual knowledge that it violated 
this act;. 
(c) claim for personal injury or death or claim 
for damage to property other than the property 
that is the subject of the consumer transaction; 
(d) credit terms of a transaction otherwise sub-
ject to this act; or 
(e) any public utility subject to the regulating 
jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission of 
the state of Utah. 
(2) A person alleged to have violated this act has 
the burden of showing the applicability of this sec-
tion. 1973 
13-11-23. Other remedies available — Class ac-
tion only as p rescr ibed by act. 
The remedies of this act are in addition to remedies 
otherwise available for the same conduct under state 
or local law, except that a class action relating to a 
transaction governed by this act may be brought only 
as prescribed by this act. 1973 
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UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
JUDITH MAYORGA, #4630 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
385 - 24th Street, #522 
Ogdenf Utah 84401 
Telephone: 394-9431 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CLYDE WADE, * OCT 2 3 1989 
Plaintiff, * AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
V. * 
LINDA JOBE, * 
Defendant- * Civil No. 89-0901383 
This matter was tried before the above-entitled Court, the 
Honorable Ronald O. Hyde, presiding, on September 7, 1989. The 
Couit, having heard the testimony and argiament of the parties and 
their witnesses, and having reviewed the file and the applicable 
law, How, hereby makes it Findings of Fact as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant rented a house at 2086 Adams Ave., Ogden, Utah, 
from the Plaintiff in June of 1988, under an oral agreement. 
Defendant was to pay rental in the amount of Three Hundred and 
Twenty Five Dollars ($325) per month and a cleaning deposit of One 
Hundred and Fifteen Dollars ($115). 
2. Plaintiff (landlord) is regularly engaged in the business 
of lenting properties to tenants. 
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3. The Defendant took occupancy of the premises on July 14, 
and had the water service turned on July 15. 
4. Defendant's tenancy was terminated on December 13, 1988, 
by a notice from the Ogden City Inspection Division that the 
pieinises were unsafe for human occupatioh due to the lack of a 
sewer connection and other problems. 
5. The Ogden City Inspection Division subsequently made 
another report on January 11, 1989, citing numerous code violations 
which were a substantial hazard to the health and safety of the 
occupants. The notice and order of thel Ogden City Inspection 
Division indicated that the subject property would be condemned if 
the violations were not remedied. 
6. The Ogden City Building Inspector testified that the 
pieinises were subject to "dozens" of violations of the Utah Housing 
Code which posed substantial dangers to the health and safety of 
the occupants, including presence of raw sewage on the sidewalks, 
and stagnant water in the basement with a foul odor. 
7. Defendant paid total rents during the five (5) month 
peiiod of her occupancy of Seven Hundred ahd Forty Dollars ($740) 
plus the One Hundred and Fifteen Dollars ($115) deposit. 
8. Defendant owed a total of Sixteen Hundred and Twenty Five 
Dollars ($1,625) for the five (5) months of her occupancy leaving 
2 
A-8 
Wade v. Jobe 
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Civil No. 890901383 
a balance owed to Plaintiff of Seven Hundred and Seventy Dollars 
($770) . 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court now enters it 
Conclusions of Law. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff should be awarded judgment in the amount of 
Seven Hundred and Seventy Dollars ($770) plus costs. 
2. Defendant was evicted on December 13 by the Ogden City 
Inspection Division. 
3. Utah law does not recognize an implied warranty of 
habitability for residential rental premises for residential rental 
premises. 
4. The Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act, § 13-11-1 et seq. , 
does not apply to a landlord/tenant agreement. 
5. If the Consumer Sales Practices Act were found to be 
applicable to this case, the evidence would not warrant a finding 
of any deceptive act or practice on the part of the landlord, as 
contemplated by the Consumer Sales Practices Act. 
6. Defendant is not entitled to any offsets in her rental 
obligation as a result of problems with the property after she 
moved in. 
3 
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7. The Court concludes that alJL monies and/or bonds 
deposited by the Plaintiff shall be released to the Plaintiff. 
DATED this [ £[ day of October, 1989J 
BY THE COl 
h^i 
RONALD O-V HYDE V^ 
District Court Judge 
Date Entered 
4 
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UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
JUDITH MAYORGA, 14630 
Attorney for Defendant 
385 - 24th Street, #522 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 394-9431 
III THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CLYDE WADE, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
LINDA JOBE, 
Defendant. 
* 
* 
°Br*3 1939 
AMENDED JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 890901383 
The Court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, NOW, HEREBY ORDERS that Plaintiff is granted judgment 
against Defendant for the following sums: 
1. a) Unpaid rent 
b) 
c) 
Court Costs 
Interest at 10% per annum from Dec. 13, 
1989 to date of Judgment 
$770.00 
15.00 
32.00 
TOTAL JUDGMENT $817.00 
d) Interest on the total Judgment at 
12 % per anuin from the date hereof 
1. All monies and/or bonds deposited by the Plaintiff to the 
Court Clerk shall be immediately released to the Plaintiff. 
2. Defendant's Counterclaim is dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this jCf day of October, 1989. 
RONALD O. HYDE ( 
District Court JudgeJ 
^ S% Mtf 
78-36-12. Exclusion of tenant without judicial 
process prohibited — Abandoned 
premises excepted. 
It is unlawful for an owner to willfully exclude a 
tenant fmm thn tenant's premises in any manner ex-
cept hy judicial pincers, provided, an owner or his 
agent shall not ho prevented from removing the con-
tents of the leased premises under Subsection 
78-30 12.6(2) and letaking the premises and attempt-
ing to tent I hem at, a fair rental value when the ten-
ant has abandoned the premises. 1981 
78-3(5-12.3. Definitions. 
CHAPTER 37 
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE 
Section 
78-37-1. fform of action — Judgment — Special 
execution. 
78-37-2. lj)eficiency judgment — Execution. 
78-37-3. Necessary parties — Unrecorded rights 
barred. 
78-37-4. Sales — Disposition of surplus moneys 
78-37-5. Sales — When debt due in installments. 
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